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Nicholas A. Ashford
Federal agencies regulating the production and
use of toxic substances increasingly have utilized
citizen advisory committees to help shape the
form of that regulation. Both the U.S. Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
turn to such committees for recommendations
on a variety of subjects, and the advisory com-
mittee has become an especially important source
of federal policy on toxic substances. Recently,
the discovery of a Reagan administration "hit list"
naming many members of EPA's Science Advisory
Board (SAB) whose views were no longer "ac-
ceptable" raised concern about questionable po-
litical manipulation of government advisory com-
mittees in general.' This article examines the
creation and use of advisory committees in the
regulation of toxic substances in manufacturing,
and suggests mechanisms to insure and improve
the effectiveness and public service functions of
of these and similar committees.
History and General Functions of
Advisory Committees'2
An advisory committee is a group of citizens ap-
pointed to provide input to governmental deci-
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sionmaking on a particular subject or issue. Al-
though the U.S. government made use of citizen
advisory groups even in the 1700s, widespread
use of advisory committees did not occur until
this century. Beginning with the administration
of Theodore Roosevelt, American presidents began
to rely on citizen advisory committees to assist
in the formulation and implementation of federal
policy. More recently, an increase in the number
of regulatory agencies has been accompanied by
a concomitant rise in the number of advisory
committees that provide input to those agencies,
especially in environmental regulation.
Awareness of increased reliance on advisory
committees has elicited a mixed response from
the legislative and executive branches. Concerned
that advisory committees can cross the line be-
tween advice and improper influence, the U.S.
Congress passed in 1972 the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA).3 Although FACA em-
braced the advisory committee as a "frequently
... useful and beneficial means of furnishing expert
advice, ideas, and diverse opinions to the Federal
Government," Congress nonetheless declared that
"the need for many existing advisory committees
has not been reviewed," and concluded that the
creation and operation of advisory committees
should be more strictly controlled. 4 Accordingly,
the Act requires that new advisory committees
be kept to a "necessary" minimum; that advisory
committees be terminated when they have served
their purpose; that the establishment, operation,
administration, and duration of advisory com-
mittees be subject to uniform procedures; and
that relevant information regarding advisory
committees be made available to the public.
In both the present and previous administrations,
the executive branch has displayed an inconsistent
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attitude toward advisory committees. The Carter
administration encouraged the increased use of
panels or groups of experts to solve difficult reg-
ulatory questions, but it discouraged the creation
of new advisory committees. Under the Heritage
Foundation's blueprint for government reorgani-
zation in the Reagan administration, the existing
advisory groups are seen as essential to the mis-
sions of the EPA, but OSHA committees are crit-
icized. To the degree that an administration regards
advisory committees as extensions of the agencies
they serve, such love-hate relationships may be
inevitable.
Throughout its history, the advisory committee
has served two general functions. First, it has
provided the federal government with a means of
obtaining expert advice on a wide range of issues
at relatively little cost.' This function has been
of critical importance in the regulation of toxic
substances. As the federal government has en-
deavored to protect the public health through the
control of toxic substances, it has entered into
an area of complex scientific, technical, and eco-
nomic decisionmaking. Advisory committees
provide the expertise that such decisions require.
By providing a means through which public
opinion on a particular issue can be made known
to responsible officials, advisory committees also
have often served a "democratic" function. For
many years, however, the advisory committees
used for this purpose were drawn almost exclu-
sively from the more privileged social and eco-
nomic classes, and failed to provide an accurate
portrayal of public opinion. Beginning with the
administration of Lyndon Johnson, the agencies
have broadened the base from which advisory
committees are drawn, selecting women and more
representatives of divergent social, economic, and
ethnic backgrounds.
Toxic Substance Advisory Committees
In the area of toxic substance regulation, the
"democratic" function of advisory committees is
mandated by statutory directives that such com-
mittees be "balanced" among differing points of
view. However, the particular kinds of tasks as-
signed to these committees also affect their nature
and accomplishments. Toxic substance advisory
committees may satisfy one or more of the fol-
lowing purposes: (1) to bring needed scientific or
technological expertise to the agency's decision-
making process; (2) to provide a mechanism for
reaching a consensus on difficult-to-resolve sci-
entific or technological issues; (3) to provide a
mechanism for policy guidance when traditional
factual resolution of scientific or technological
issues is not possible, or (4) to provide a means
of expanding the participation of interested or
affected parties.
A committee of technical experts addressing
the toxicity of carbon monoxide or alternative
ventilation technologies, for example, might be
constituted to meet the first purpose. Here, if
there is little real disagreement on the relevant
scientific or technical issues, the committee guides
the agency to the latest and best information.
When scientific or technical issues are difficult
to resolve-for example, on the question of
whether saccharin is a human carcinogen-the
advisory committee can provide a forum for tech-
nical experts and attempt to achieve consensus
on what is the "best" scientific judgment.
When the "factual" resolution of a scientific or
technological issue is not possible in the traditional
sense, the advisory committee provides a mech-
anism for policy guidance. This category encom-
passes many important issues in toxic substance
regulation, such as the extrapolation of animal
test data to humans; the interpolation of high-
dose data to low-exposure conditions; the use-
fulness of short-term in vitro tests for assessing
carcinogenicity; the reversibility of cell transfor-
mation induced by carcinogens; the distinction
between benign and malignant tumors; and the
prediction of technological innovation in response
to regulation. Here, in the absence of satisfactory
concrete scientific evidence, the final regulatory
decision in each case must be based upon certain
assumptions that concern science but are grounded
in social policy determinations.6 If no evidence
exists to link a substance's carcinogenicity in an-
imals to cancer in humans, then an advisory com-
mittee renders policy advice whenever it rec-
ommends permissible human exposure levels for
that substance. Such a recommendation, although
(presumably) guided by the animal data, rests ul-
timately on a balancing of social attitudes toward
risk and utility, rather than on a mechanical eval-
uation of technical data.
Finally, in its most "democratic" sense, an ad-
visory committee can facilitate the participation
of interested parties in the regulatory decision-
making process. This participation serves the po-
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litical purpose of fair representation and could
defuse subsequent adversary interactions. By rais-
ing the consciousness of technical experts to al-
ternative views, the advisory committee system
may also facilitate the entry of technical people
into the regulatory agencies as permanent or "ro-
tator" staff.
When scientific judgment is subject to prejudices
and bias, or where difficult judgment calls vary
widely and where divergent but not clearly in-
correct points of view exist, the distinction so
clearly shown in these functions-between fact-
finding and fair process-begins to blur. As federal
appellate courts have indicated in their review of
OSHA cases, issues on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge are not factual determinations in the
usual sense; rather, they are decisions of social
policy, and are legislative rather than judicial in
character. 7 As advisory committees are deeply
immersed in policy issues, the importance of
composition that includes a variety of opposing
viewpoints increases, lest committee policies serve
only a narrow set of interests.
The Legal Framework for OSHA and
EPA Advisory Committees
As noted above, the Federal Advisory Committee
Act sets forth general guidelines and procedures
applicable to all federal advisory committees. Not
only does the Act require open meetings, detailed
transcripts, a limited right of public participation,
and the attendance of a federal government rep-
resentative at advisory committee meetings, but
Sections 5(b)(2) and 5(cl also state that committee
membership should be "fairly balanced in terms
of points of view represented and the functions
to be performed." The recommendations of an
advisory committee are, except where otherwise
specifically authorized by statute, to be "advisory"
only. More specific language dealing with toxic
substances committees occurs in the Occupational
Safety and Health Act OSH Act) and in the En-
vironmental Research, Development, and Dem-
onstration Authorization Act of 1978 (ERDDA).8
In addition, EPA's Office of Toxic Substances has
created an advisory committee. These advisory
committees and subcommittees (see Table 1) fall
into three general categories: "permanent" ad-
visory committees created by statute to advise
agencies on science, technology, or general policy
Table 1. U.S. toxic substances advisory committees.&
OSHA EPA
Permanent NACOSH SAB
Quasipermanent ATSAC
Ad hoc Specific
standards
committees
Policy-oriented X X X
Science/technology X X
Balanced X X X
Expert only X
* Reprinted by permission of the publisher, from Law and
Science in Collaboration, edited by J.D. Nyhart and Milton
M. Carrow Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and
Company, Copyright 1983, D.C. Heath and Company).
issues; "quasipermanent" committees, usually
created administratively, to advise agencies on
science, technology, or general policy issues; and
"ad hoc" committees, created either by statute
or administratively, to advise agencies on a specific
issue of science, technology, or policy.
Section 7(a) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act establishes a mandatory, permanent,
"balanced" advisory committee known as the
National Advisory Committee on Occupational
Safety and Health (NACOSH) to advise the Sec-
retary of Labor and the Secretary of Health and
Human Services on general issues pertaining to
the administration of the OSH Act. The com-
mittee's twelve members are drawn from man-
agement, labor, occupational safety and health
professionals, and the public, and are selected
"upon the basis of their experience and competence
in the field of occupational safety and health."
NACOSH is required to hold no fewer than two
meetings during each calendar year.
In addition, the OSH Act makes provision for
the creation of limited-lifetime, "balanced," ad
hoc advisory committees to consider specific sub-
jects related to the setting of occupational stan-
dards. The authority for such committees is found
in Section 7(b) of the Act, which empowers, but
does not require, the Secretary of Labor to appoint
special advisory committees "to assist him in his
standard-setting function under Section 6." Each
of these committees is to have no more than
fifteen members, and is to be balanced equally
between "persons qualified by experience and af-
filiation to present the viewpoint of the employers
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involved" and "persons similarly qualified to
present the viewpoint of the workers involved."
In addition, an ad hoc committee must include
at least one representative of a state health and
safety agency, and may include other persons "who
are qualified by knowledge and experience to make
a useful contribution," as long as the number of
such representatives does not exceed the number
from federal or state agencies.
Although the Environmental Protection Agency
established a Science Advisory Board (SAB)
administratively in 1974, that Board was subse-
quently established by statute in the
Environmental Research, Development, and
Demonstration Authorization Act. The original
Board consisted of five standing committees and
an executive committee. Under the Reagan ad-
ministration, however, the EPA reduced the num-
ber of standing committees to three. By statute,
these committees are to meet penodically with
the EPA Administrator "to provide advice .. . on
the scientific and technical aspects of environ-
mental problems and issues." Their membership
is to be "a body of independent scientists and
engineers of sufficient size and diversity to provide
a range of expertise required to assess the scientific
and technical aspects of environmental issues," 9
and additional ad hoc committees may be drawn
from the members.
EPA's regulation of toxic substances is also as-
sisted by an administratively created advisory
committee known as the Administrator's Toxic
Substance Advisory Committee ATSAC). This
quasipermanent, "balanced" committee focuses
pnmarily on issues of policy rather than issues
of science. According to its charter, ATSAC is to
advise the EPA "on policy, technical and procedural
matters relating to the environmental, economic,
and social aspects" of implementing the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), and to "consider
and comment on proposals for rules and regula-
tions." However, the committee is directed to
"generally defer" on scientific matters to the Sci-
ence Advisory Board. The committee's sixteen
members are to be drawn, "in appropnate balance,"
from three groups: (a) manufacturers, processors,
and users of chemical substances; (b) environ-
mental, health, and public interest organizations;
and (c) other interested parties, "including, but
not limited to, labor organizations, professional
societies, and state and local interests." The com-
mittee is also authorized to form ad hoc subcom-
mittees to deal with specific issues. ATSAC itself
must hold from three to six meetings a year; the
subcommittees are directed to meet "as needed."'0
In addition to scientific and technical compe-
tence being represented in the committees them-
selves, both ATSAC and NACOSH typically re-
quest outside experts to address them on tchnical
issues. Through these means, education of the
committees is a continuing event. The SAB rarely
operates in this manner.
Advisory Committee Performance
In general, advisory committees play a constructive
role in developing regulatory policies for toxic
substances. Members have usually been knowl-
edgeable, and the deliberations valuable and in-
structive. All things considered, they have dealt
well with the science and technology questions
presented to them.
OSHA's twelve-member permanent committee,
NACOSH, has been a major forum for discussing
and clarifying controversial issues before unnec-
essary adversarial interactions occur. For example,
NACOSH investigated the idea of adopting a ge-
neric cancer policy long before OSHA promulgated
any formal rule. The committee served as an in-
tellectual testing ground, and a review of its public
transcripts reveals penetrating discussions of dif-
ficult questions on the science-law interface. Re-
productive hazards were discussed with sophis-
tication, and even internal "administrative" issues,
such as research needs and opportunities and
agency effectiveness, were addressed.
The ad hoc standard-setting committees have
proved somewhat less integral to the OSHA pro-
cess. An ad hoc committee is not always-in fact,
usually is not-appointed as part of the standard-
setting procedure. When a committee has been
appointed, OSHA's response to committee rec-
ommendations has been mixed. On some occasions
(for example, the coke oven emissions standards),
OSHA has taken the committee's advice and based
a standard on the recommendations. On other
occasions, such as the early experiences with pes-
ticide exposures, the agency has departed widely,
and vigorously, from committee recommendations.
OSHA's reticence in utilizing standard-setting
committees may stem, in part, from their tran-
sitory nature. Although the ability to appoint sep-
arate committees for different standards provides
desirable flexibility on scientific and technical
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issues, it may be less than desirable for developing
uniform policy and may lead to an uneven approach
to standard-setting. A solution might lie with the
appointment of a core of "standing" members
who would serve on all ad hoc committees.
Unlike OSHA, EPA does not receive general
policy advice on toxic substances from a broadly
focused permanent committee. Its main advisory
body, the Science Advisory Board, is concerned
primarily with issues of science and technology
rather than issues of policy. On issues related
specifically to the implementation of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, however, EPA regularly
receives advisory committee recommendations on
toxic substance policy from the Administrator's
Toxic Substance Advisory Comrmttee ATSAC1."
ATSAC has monitored the ongoing implemen-
tation of TSCA, and has addressed, among other
issues, regulatory strategies for new and existing
chemicals, testing rules, and the relationship be-
tween regulation and innovation in the chermical
industry. Because EPA has taken no significant
regulatory action (other than on PCBs) under
TSCA, ATSAC's effectiveness is yet to be tested.
Analysis of its transcripts, however, reveals in-
telligent, probing discussions that closely parallel
those held by NACOSH. One striking feature of
ATSAC is the presence on the committee of both
environmental lawyers and scientists.
Because ATSAC must defer to the Science Ad-
visory Board on technical issues, EPA's science
advice in the area of toxic substances comes from
the SAB. Here, in contrast to OSHA's standard-
setting committees, ad hoc committees are drawn
from the larger SAB membership, thus providing
both flexibility and continuity. Although the board
is charged with the responsibility for technical
issues, it often deals with issues which touch on
policy as well. In a broad sense, its activities are
to include the review of EPA programs and strat-
egies, the review of the scientific basis of proposed
criteria documents, standards, limitations, and
regulation, and the recommendation of new stan-
dards and programs. EPA records indicate that
SAB activities in 1979 focused mainly on analyses
of the scientific bases of proposed standards, on
evaluations of the health effects of particular tox-
ins, and on general issues of evaluation meth-
odology and environmental modeling. EPA de-
scribed the activities relevant to TSCA as follows:
Analysis of the scientific data bases now in ex-
istence and new ones required for implementation
of the Toxic Substances Control Act TSCA) is
the continuing activity of a permanent subcom-
mittee. The subcommittee also is analyzing the
potential of current and planned EPA research to
provide necessary support for TSCA. u1
Based on their performance to date, advisory
committees appear to have the potential to make
significant contributions to decisions on toxic
substance regulation. Their chief contribution may
lie in their facility to integrate and distinguish
questions of science and questions of policy be-
cause transcripts of the NACOSH and ATSAC
meetings reveal a growing conviction that un-
certainty in science or technology does not pre-
clude effective regulatory response to a problem.
Naturally enough, however, committee members
disagree about the type of response. Accordingly,
the most heated committee discussions have cen-
tered on issues of policy, not science, even where
the science has been uncertain.
The Fair Balance Issue13
Analysis of the legislative and administrative
history of the adoption of the statutory requirement
for fair balance suggests that it was intended to
achieve the following objectives: i1) to increase
the numbers of "individuals affected by agency
action" as participants on advisory committees;
(2) to avoid overrepresentation of a particular geo-
graphic region, university, industry, company, or
discipline on any advisory committee; (3) to in-
clude more consumers and representatives of
public interest groups as members, in an effort
to balance industry representation; 4) to include
more "nonexperts" (i.e., lay people) as members,
but to ensure that they are interested and knowl-
edgeable; and (5) to preclude a domination of the
committee by any one viewpoint or interest that
might give some private concerns special access
to public policymakers.' 4
If there is a great potential for improving the
regulatory process through the use of advisory
committees, a similar opportunity exists for sub-
verting that process through their misuse. Gov-
ernments have sometimes used advisory com-
mittees for little more than implementing a
decision made before the committee was estab-
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lished, either by appointing members who will
merely "rubber stamp" government decisions, or
by appointing influential community leaders
whose support is needed for implementation of
a government decision.l5 Until recently, OSHA
and EPA appear to have avoided such blatant ma-
nipulation. OSHA has now replaced eleven of the
twelve members on NACOSH, however, and EPA
has retired practically all of its sixty SAB members,
many who were on the previously mentioned "hit
list."'6 Thus, even though the scientific experts
may, as individuals, be protective of their profes-
sional standing, manipulation of advisory com-
mittees is possible by appointment of only "ac-
ceptable" members.
The key to such misuse is an agency's circum-
vention of the requirement of Section 5 of FACA
that advisory committee membership be "fairly
balanced in terms of the points of view repre-
sented." Although some observers have expressed
doubt over the meaning of this provision,' 7 the
statute's plain language and the relevant legislative
history give fairly clear signals of its intentions. 8
Fairness demands more than a token representation
of an opposing viewpoint. The statute clearly an-
ticipates a good faith effort at parity. 9 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, echoing language found
in the House of Representatives Committee Report
explaining Section 5, has indicated that the pro-
vision's underlying purpose is to prevent any one
point of view from "dominating" the consideration
of an issue.z0 It should be realized that, of course,
in advisory committee deliberations, consensus-
building for policy recommendations generally
avoids domination by a bare majority. To be ef-
fective, heavy consensus Is required, and thus,
unless the committee is heavily stacked, some
imbalance is tolerable.2 '
In formulating an operational definition of
"balance" to meet the FACA requirements, three
criteria are suggested: competence, discipline, and
bias/allegiance.2 Balance in the effectiveness of
technical argument surely requires equivalent
competence or expertise among antagonists, yet
experts as a group may need to be tempered by
the participation of nonexpert members. Each
discipline carries its own paradigmatic bias, and
both nonexperts and several disciplines should be
represented, the mixture depending on the com-
mittee's agenda or purpose. Finally, political, in-
stitutional, ethnic or sexual bias or allegiance
should be adequately "balanced." Most of the at-
tention in addressing the fair balance requirement
seems to have been focused on this last criterion.
"Competence" Balance
Balance in the effectiveness of technical argument
requires equivalent technical competence among
those members who differ with regard to political
or policy matters, and this, in turn, presupposes
equivalent commitment to utilize that competence
in fulfilling committee responsibilities. One of
the easiest ways for an agency to secure a com-
mittee's adoption of a particular position is to
appoint less-than-competent or uncommitted
members to represent opposing positions. In ad-
dition, as one commentator has noted, committees
may be stacked with "distinguished" members
rather than those whose competencies relate to
the agenda.3
Disciplinary Balance
A committee composed entirely of scientists is
clearly not balanced between experts and nonex-
perts, but it also may not be balanced among
technical disciplines, thereby masking a source
of consistent bias. Asked by an agency, for example,
to develop exposure standards for a chemical on
which the evidence of human carcinogenicity is
conflicting, scientists will tend to take a "con-
servative" posture. Inclined by both training and
experience to adopt a "wait and see" attitude or
to call for further study, these members might
decline to express a position on carcinogenicity
until more conclusive evidence is available. An
agency that desires a conservative position on a
question of toxic substance policy therefore stands
a better chance of securing that position by sub-
mitting the issue to a purely scientific committee.
As a general rule, the more the issues facing
an advisory committee are policy-related, the more
its objectivity in considering those issues will
depend on the degree to which committee mem-
bership is balanced on all relevant factors. Lack
of balance among scientific subspecialties, how-
ever, can also affect the consideration of largely
scientific issues. Suppose that an advisory com-
mittee is asked to evaluate the carcinogenic risk
posed by exposure to vinyl bromide. Those sci-
entists whose general research involves animal
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studies of carcinogenicity may view the risk dif-
ferently than epidemiologists who study patterns
of disease among humans or those scientists who
develop short-term tests for mutagenicity for pre-
dicting carcinogenicity. Disciplinary bias can
greatly affect the "scientific" determination of
carcinogenicity because one kind of evidence may
carry more weight than another.
Among toxic substance advisory committees,
the EPA's Science Advisory Board is conspicuous
for its lack of disciplinary balance. To the extent
that the SAB delves into policy matters-such as
recommending standards or assessing nsk-benefit
methodologies-this imbalance may pose a po-
tentially serious problem. In part, the imbalance
is the result of SAB's Congressional mandate. The
enabling statute, ERDDA, specifies that SAB
membership be drawn from persons "qualified by
education, training, and experience to evaluate
scientific and technical information on matters
referred to the Board," 24 a mandate that would
appear to exclude nonscienusts. The language does
not, however, obviate the other balancing re-
quirements of FACA. Rather than continuing to
restrict membership to "scientists and engineers,"
EPA should properly seek a membership that rep-
resents a fair balance of other disciplines meeting
the statutory criteria of technical competence. In
addition, the SAB must be balanced on all relevant
factors of bias or allegiance and competence.
Congress recently had the occasion to reaffirm
its intention that FACA be applied to the SAB.
An EPA appropriations bill, repeating the language
of FACA, specifically required SAB membership
to be "fairly balanced in terms of points of view
represented" and required that such balance be
achieved through the inclusion of members rep-
resenting "the states, industry, labor, academia,
consumers, and the general public."' On 22 Oc-
tober 1982, Ronald Reagan vetoed the bill and
gave his objections to these requirements as the
major reason.2 6 In his veto message he stated:
... This requirement runs counter to the basic
premise of modem scientific thought as an ob-
jective undertaking in which the views of special
interests have no role. The purpose of the Science
Advisory Board is to apply the universally accepted
principles of scientific peer review to the research
conclusions that will form the basis for EPA reg-
ulations, a function that must remain above in-
terest group politics.
In addition, under the statutes governing actual
promulgation of EPA rules, the Administrator is
obligated to seek public comment from any and
all interested parties and to weigh such comment
in shaping final rules. That is the stage of the
rulemaking process at which involvement of spe-
cial interest viewpoints is appropriate, not the
earlier stage of developing a sound scientific un-
derstanding of the research findings that may be
relevant to a particular rulemaking or class of
rules. 2
Such a viewpoint assumes that only "neutral"
scientists are appropriate, and further assumes
that such persons exist.28
Despite the Presidential veto, Congressional ef-
forts to achieve a fair balance on the SAB continue.
Reportedly, the issue will be the subject of public
hearings during the Fall 1983 session of Congress.29
"Bias/Allegiance" Balance
Balancing must also be achieved in the bias and
allegiance of committee members. Although,
broadly speaking, we are all affected by toxic sub-
stances regulation, some persons are more directly
affected than others. Accordingly, FACA's legis-
lative history indicates that the Act requires that
industry representatives on a committee be bal-
anced by representatives of the environmental
movement.3 ° Indeed, FACA's Section 5(b)(3) re-
quires that "appropriate provisions" be taken to
ensure that the advice and recommendations of
the advisory committee will not be inappropriately
influenced by the appointing authority or by any
special interest, but will instead be the result of
the advisory committee's independent judgment.
FACA also acknowledges several general "bias"
criteria, such as political orientation, institutional
affiliation, race, sex, and geography. This aspect
of the balancing requirement would appear to in-
sulate advisory committee members from "po-
litical" removal, and might require a degree of
membership continuity from administration to
administration.
Perhaps because of Section 5(b)(3), bias and al-
legiance have received the greatest attention in
agency efforts to balance committee membership.
But such balancing may have been perfunctory.
For example, one commentator reports that eval-
uations of prospective committee member's po-
tential allegiances have usually not considered
sources of employment, grants, and contracts.3'
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Given the potentially large number of relevant
factors on which balance must be achieved, com-
pliance with the fair balance requirement will
sometimes be difficult. For scientific and technical
advisory committees, the requirement of technical
competence also narrows the pool of candidates
from which the other relevant criteria must be
satisfied. Mere difficulty, however, does not excuse
noncompliance. If toxic substance advisory com-
mittees are truly to exercise the "independent
judgment" that FACA requires, OSHA and EPA
must be forthright and diligent in their efforts to
achieve proper committee balance.
Fair balance alone will not insulate advisory
committees from misuse. An agency may avoid
ad hoc committees, for example, by merely failing
to establish them. An agency may reduce the size
of advisory committees, reduce their funding, or
hold meetings only infrequently. It may refuse to
cooperate with the committees by denying them
timeiy access to agency records or personnel. And,
of course, it may always simply gnore advisory
committee recommendations. In each of these
cases, however, the agency's antagonism toward
the advisory committee will be more or less ob-
vious. Only the lack of fair balance will enable
an agency to subvert the advisory committee pro-
cess while still appearing to be using it properly.
It is this criteria, then, that merits special attention
both by the public and by policy analysts.
Recommendations for improving the
Effectiveness of Toxic Substance
Advisory Committees
To be effective, an advisory committee must not
only provide objective, intelligent, and thoughtful
advice to the agency, but the agency must also
give due consideration to that advice, and to the
advisory committee process, in the formulation
of its regulatory policies. To achieve that effec-
tiveness, advisory committees must satisfy several
criteria. First, of course, they must have a balanced
and committed membership. The committee must
be provided the necessary independence within
which to pursue its work, must be given adequate
financial support, and must receive the full support
and cooperation of its parent agency. And there
must be a strong and independent chairperson to
shepherd the advisory committee through its sen-
sitive work. The absence of any one of these factors
can render an advisory committee little more than
an empty bureaucratic exercise.
The OSHA and EPA advisory committees dis-
cussed here would benefit from attention to each
of these items. Aside from the fair balance issues,
frequency of committee meetings, cooperation in
agenda-setting, and continuity and longevity of
committee membership should be considered.
Ongoing advisory committees need to meet, on
the average, every six weeks to two months if
they are to consider the issues adequately. Cur-
rently, most toxic substance committees meet
less frequently. NACOSH, for example, has met
only twice in the twelve months preceding com-
pletion of this study.
Committee agendas are a critical factor, as well.
If advisory committees have insufficient autonomy
to determine the issues they will consider, im-
portant issues may be overlooked, and the advisory
committee may cease to function as an inde-
pendent body. Furthermore, interested, activist
members may leave the committee in frustration.
This is not to say that agenda-setting should be
left solely to the committee. Rather, good faith
cooperation between the agency and the committee
will be the key to identifying those issues that
should appear on the agenda.
Continuity is also an important factor. As
members serve together on a committee, they
build a personal relationship that can transcend
individual political and disciplinary biases and
help them to work more objectively and effectively
toward the public interest. Thus, while the es-
tablishment of an "old boy" (or "old girl") network
should be avoided, both OSHA and EPA should
be more judicious in their replacement of advisory
committee members. In addition to conflicting
with the fair balance requirement, wholesale "po-
litical" replacements will serve only to lessen
advisory committee effectiveness.
President Reagan's veto of a specific balancing
requirement for the SAB was supported by both
the National Academy of Sciences and the Amer-
ican Association for the Advancement of Science.32
This support, in light of the history of the EPA
"hit list," suggests that, driven by the desire to
maintain the illusion of neutrality of science and
scientists, the scientific community may, as a
practical matter, prefer covert stacking to overt
balancing. How, then, can such stacking and im-
balance be avoided? If overt balancing cannot be
maintained, an alternate course may be to require
all advisory committee members to disclose not
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only their current professional affiliation but also
their present and past consulting arrangements
and other activities. Full disclosure, at least,
will let the public know more about the com-
position of a particular committee.
In the final analysis, the effectiveness of advisory
committees may well depend on the degree to
which their use is subjected to public scrutiny.
The Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Federal
Open Meetings Act, and the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act all provide mechanisms through which
citizens can monitor advisory committee pro-
ceedings. And legal channels are available to check
agency abuse of the advisory committee process.
Use of these channels, however, demands close
attention to the details of administrative law. Legal
challenges to arguably "unbalanced" advisory
committee memberships have failed, for example,
because the party mounting the challenge did not
object to the unbalanced nature of the committee
when it was originally constituted.3 4 Continued
and spirited citizen monitoring of advisory com-
mittees may therefore be a necessary predicate to
legal action. Only with the help of a watchful
citizenry and a concerned Congress can advisory
committees fulfill their potential to serve the
public interest.
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